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Neoliberal growth models, monetary union and the Euro Crisis. A post-Keynesian 
perspective  
 
1 Introduction 
 
The financial crisis began in the market for derivatives of US subprime mortgages and 
translated into the worst recession since the 1930s in all advanced economies. However, 
seven years after the crisis began the experience differs dramatically across countries. Only in 
parts of Europe has the crisis mutated into a sovereign debt crisis and economic depression. 
This paper offers an analysis that puts neoliberalism at the very heart of the crisis in Europe – 
both as a cause of the imbalances at the root of the crisis and, specific to the EMU (Economic 
and Monetary Union), as an economic policy regime that has turned the financial crisis into a 
sovereign debt crisis.  
 
Neoliberalism is an attempt to modernise liberal thought and policy after the great wars. 
Theoretically it has modified the conceptualisation of markets, states and individuals 
(Foucault 2008, Mirowsky and Plehwe 2009). Politically it encompasses a variety of projects 
that have been shaped by the specific historical constellations and power relations (Harvey 
2005, Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). The contribution of the paper is that it uses 
post-Keynesian Economics (PKE) to provide a macroeconomically-grounded analysis of 
variegated neoliberalism. We, firstly, use the post-Keynesian (PK) typology of demand 
regimes to analyse the dynamics and instability of debt-driven and export-driven growth and, 
secondly, PK monetary theory which argues that money has a state origin but is created by 
private financial institutions.  
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We argue that neoliberalism has given rise to an unstable finance-dominated accumulation 
regime. It has not led to a sustained profit-led growth process, but to two complementary 
growth models that rely either on financial bubbles and rising household debt (‘debt-driven 
growth’) or on rising export surpluses (‘export-driven growth’). In Europe, their emergence is 
closely linked to the process of European integration along neoliberal lines. It has, on the one 
hand, fostered financial deregulation and, as a consequence, financial flows that fuelled the 
housing bubbles notably in Spain and Ireland. On the other hand it has paired fixed exchange 
rates with a neoliberal economic policy regime that has allowed the German ruling classes to 
pursue a neo-mercantilist strategy. Trade imbalances as well as the build-up of debt are 
closely related to neoliberal strategies.  
 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) came with an economic policy package that is rule 
bound and has proven exceptionally dysfunctional during the crisis. It is inspired by 
ordoliberalism, a variante of neoliberalism, which aims at aims at constraining government 
intervention and has an anti-Keynesian logic. This policy regime favours downward flexible 
wages (or ‘internal devaluation’) as the preferred adjustment mechanism, which creates a 
deflationary bias and puts the adjustment burden on the deficit countries. We argue that the 
imposition of rigid rules on monetary and fiscal policy and the exposure of government 
finances to market pressures is not an accident, but an integral part of the neoliberal project. 
These constraints have become binding in the crisis, preventing national fiscal policies from 
counteracting the recession. Worse, it has imposed pro-cyclical austerity policies on those 
countries most affected by the crisis. The separation of money and central banks in this 
framework has created a highly unstable situation that undermines nation states’ ability to act. 
The resulting dialectics between the private and the public sector debt helps explaining why 
the economic crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis under EMU.  
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In a nutshell, the PK interpretation regards the internal and external imbalances as arising 
from neoliberal growth models. Both financialisation and neo-mercantilist wage suppression 
have played a critical role here. However, only in the context of the separation of monetary 
and fiscal spaces of EMU did the recession lead to a sovereign debt crisis. And only with 
austerity policies imposed on countries in crisis did recession turn into depression. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces PKE, which features state-backed fiat 
money that is created by commercial banks and offers a typology of growth models along the 
pattern of demand formation and changes in income distribution. Section 3 analyses the 
export-driven and debt-driven growth models in Europe. It substantiates the distinction 
empirically and clarifies differences in PK and competing explanations. Section 4 discusses 
Neoliberalism and the EMU’s economic policy regime, which eliminates the classic tools of 
national economic policy. Section 5 highlights how the neoliberal European economic policy 
regime has amplified the crisis and discusses the dialectics of public and private debt. Section 
6 concludes by outlining a Keynesian alternative for European economic policy. 
 
2 Post-Keynesian Economics, demand regimes and monetary theory  
 
In the wake of the Great Depression Keynes argued that effective demand is the key for 
understanding crises. Keynesian theory then bifurcated into a stream that tried to create a 
synthesis with neoclassical economics and a radical stream that developed Keynes’ short-run 
theory into a growth theory and opposed its assimilation into mainstream economics (Lavoie 
2009, King 2002). This latter stream is known on as post-Keynesian (PK) theory. In contrast 
to its mainstream cousin it emphasises fundamental uncertainty as a pervasive feature of a 
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capitalist economy, rejects methodological individualism and uses a class-analytic 
macroeconomic framework where social conflict and power relations are key for 
understanding inflation and income distribution.  
 
The concept of effective demand is the unifying theme for PKE. In a situation of involuntary 
unemployment the level of effective demand will determine the level of output. Effective 
demand in PKE is monetary demand and Walby (2013) identifies PKE (under the label 
‘heterodox’) as one of four frameworks for the analysis of finance. First, money is a liquid 
asset that is held, in part, to allow flexibility in a world with an uncertain future. Money is 
thus, in particular in times of crises, held as an asset and not as a means for real transactions. 
Second, money is created endogenously as a side effect of commercial bank lending. In the 
PK view credit creates deposits, not vice versa as in most standard economics textbooks. 
Money is neither a commodity (as in Marxian and classical economics) nor is created by 
central banks (as in Monetarist theory). Third, while money is created, in the modern 
economy, by private banks, its origins lie with the state and sovereign authority. The state is 
not only the largest borrower, but it also uses legal and coercive powers to establish its 
currency. State authority is at the foundation of the hierarchy of monies. This analysis of 
money has great similarity with that of economic sociologists like Ingham (2004) or 
anthropologists like Graeber (2011). Money is based on sovereign power but is created by 
profit-seeking private institutions. Forth, in a monetary production economy the lending 
decisions of banks become a key variable. Keynes (1936) and Minsky (1986) highlight the 
role of financial factors, credit and leverage cycles are an important explanation of business 
cycles and economic crises as private lending decisions tend to be highly pro-cyclical, 
amplifying booms and trapping the economy in liquidity and debt-overhang crises.  
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In its analysis of demand regimes PKE has highlighted the effect of changes in income 
distribution on effective demand. Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) formulate a Keynes-Marx 
synthesis model to analyse changes in the distribution between capital and labour and their 
demand effects. A rise in the wage share has a negative effect on investment (higher profits 
lead to higher investment), a positive effect on consumption (because capitalists save more 
than workers) and a negative effects on net exports (because the higher wages imply a loss of 
competitiveness). The net effect will depend on the relative size of the partial effects and may 
differ by country and time period. If the net effect of a rise in the wage share is positive, i.e. if 
the consumption effect outweighs the investment (and net export effect), the demand regime 
is called wage led, if it is negative it is called profit led (Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013).1  
 
We argue that PKE can provide important insights in the nature and dynamics of 
neoliberalism and, in particular, the articulation of crisis of the Euro area. PKE differs from 
mainstream economics, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach and Marxist Political 
Economy (MPE) on several grounds. First, it has a strong focus on demand formation, 
whereas neoclassical theory, VoC and MPE all tend to favour supply-side factors. PKE offers 
an analysis of demand regimes that allows for wage-led as well profit-led growth. There is no 
a priori assumption that profits get reinvested and higher wage growth can result in higher 
aggregate demand. VoC routinely assumes that wage moderation has positive growth and 
                                                 
1 A similar set of distinctions can be made with respect to debt. An increase in debt will have expansionary 
effects as far as debtors have a higher propensity to spend than creditors. However, it will also have a negative 
effect, typically delayed, as higher debt levels imply higher interest payments from debtors to creditors, which 
dampens aggregate demand (Dutt 2006). 
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employment effects; in other words they assume a profit-led demand regime.2 Marxist theory 
usually has a secondary, short-run role for demand, but it tends to assume that growth is 
profit-led in the long run (e.g. Dumenil and Levy 1999, Foley and Michl 1999). Crises 
originate from the (lack of) production of surplus value or from a rising organic composition 
of capital, not from lack of demand. Indeed, in Marxist theory crises are often regarded as 
rooted in overaccumulation, i.e. excessive investment due to competitive pressures (e.g. 
Brenner 1998). MPE has theorised constellations that PK would characterise a wage-led 
demand regime under the heading of underconsumption crises. However, these constellations 
create a tension to the Marxist theory of exploitation, because they allow for increased wages 
to have a positive effect on profitability. The link between exploitation and profitability thus 
gets broken.  
 
Second, PKE theory of money is unique in that the dialectics between the state and the 
private sector in the origins of money, the endogenous and pro-cyclical nature money 
creation, and the importance of debt for understanding crises. This contrasts to mainstream 
economics and MPE, which view money, as regards its origin, as a produced commodity. 
Neoclassical economics regards money as an efficient private-sector improvement upon the 
inconveniences of a barter economy. MPE regards money as a commodity, which is why it 
can serve as the general equivalent in exchange relations (Marx 1976, 162f; de Brunhoff and 
                                                 
2 A similar argument can be made for mainstream economics. New Keynesian economics has a short-run role 
for aggregate demand, but asserts the dominance of supply-side factors in the long run and it usually is silent on 
the possibility of wage-led growth. Indeed, a downward-sloping labour demand function, i.e. a profit-led 
demand regimes, are routinely assumed.  
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Foley 2007).3 VoC has no theory of money, but frequently uses the distinction of market-
based vs. bank-based financial systems. 
 
PKE is a coherent, if marginalised school of thought within the economics discipline and has 
been able to develop an academically productive research program. However, it is also 
narrow in scope and is restricted to the economic domain. Social phenomena like classes or 
institutions do play an explanatory role in the analysis, but are taken as given. Unlike MPE 
PKE does not offer a theory of the state or of power relations which may explain why it has 
of yet received limited attention by other social scientists. In our view both PKE and social 
and political scientists could benefit from cooperation. 
 
3 Neoliberal growth models and the imbalances in Europe 
 
There is an extensive debate on the nature of neoliberalism, where globalisation, 
financialisation and rising inequality have been identified as key features (Foucault 2007, 
Harvey 2005, Brenner et al 2010, Duménil and Lévy 2004, Glyn 2006, Dardot and Laval 
2013). Brenner et al (2009) provide an insightful typology of theoretical conceptions of 
neoliberalism by distinguishing between VoC, Historical Materialist International Political 
Economy (HM-IPE) and neo-Foucauldian approaches. VOC regards neoliberalisms as a 
generalisation of the liberal market economy model; HM-IPE analyses neoliberalism as a 
                                                 
3 There are several recent attempts to update Marxian theory of money and finance (e.g. Crotty 1985, Lapavitsas 
2000, Bellofiore 2005). These build on Marx’ analysis of credit cycles in volume III of Capital and usually 
heavily draw on PK theory and to various degrees go beyond a commodity theory of money. In so far as they do 
that they are, often implicitly, parting with the labour theory of value: if money is not a produced commodity, 
then commodity exchange is not an exchange of equivalents as claimed in Volume I of Capital (Marx 1976). 
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global project of restoration of class power via financialisation and globalisation, which is 
underpinned by an emerging trans-national capitalist class; the neo-Foucauldian approach 
highlights the haphazard and sporadic proliferation of neoliberalising political rationalities, 
which take on a de-centred dynamic. Brenner et al then proceed to endorse a concept of 
variegated neoliberalisation that seeks to keep balance between the diversity of neoliberal 
experiences and coherent concept of neoliberalism. However, in doing so they operate on a 
high level of abstraction and offer little specific analysis of neoliberal variegation. Jessop 
(2011) moves further by advocating the concept of variegated capitalism highlighting the 
conflictive nature of capitalism, which gets only temporarily regulated by spatio-temporal 
institutional fixes. His analysis recognises forces that transcend nation states like 
financialization and globalization, but also the differentiating forces brought about by centre-
periphery relations. Overall he presents an ambitious research program for societal analysis, 
but does not offer an analysis of the economic dynamics itself. PKE can offer a typology of 
growth models that clarifies variegation in terms of demand regimes and highlights the 
contradictory dynamics of neoliberalisation. In analysing its macroeconomic logic we do treat 
neoliberalism as a system rather than as a sporadic proliferation of practices. 
 
From a macroeconomic viewpoint neoliberalism has been highly effective in restructuring in 
labour relations and the financial sphere. In the Anglo-Saxon countries neoliberalism came 
with an outright attack on organized labour (the miners’ strike in Great Britain and the air 
traffic controllers’ strike in the USA). In continental Europe the organisational strength of 
labour was eroded by two decades of high unemployment, welfare state retrenchment and 
globalization. The effects of these events on income distribution have been profound (see 
Atkinson et al. 2012 on top incomes and Stockhammer 2016 on wage shares). Financial 
deregulation has a domestic and an international dimension. Capital flows between countries 
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have been liberalized, and within countries deregulation has allowed for financial innovation, 
eventually fuelling a rise in debt and speculative activities. Financial ratios such as stock 
market capitalization, derivatives turnover or cross-border lending have soared and the 
income shares of financial capital have increased considerably (Duménil and Lévy 2004). 
Moreover, the influence of financial investors on non-financial businesses has increased 
substantially under the so-called shareholder value revolution (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000). These structural changes have been summarily called financialization and plays a key 
role in our analysis of the structure of accumulation (Stockhammer 2012b, Hein 2012).  
 
Neoliberalism has led to a polarisation of income distribution expressed in rising profits and 
top incomes, but remarkably, this has nowhere translated into a business investment boom. 
Capitalists did not invest their profits, which is at odds with Marx’s analysis in Capital, 
where they are forced to do so by competitive pressures. Keynesians have long argued that 
investment decisions are not reducible to optimising behaviour or competitive pressures, but 
retain a large degree of autonomy and are shaped by social conventions, mass psychology 
and the historically specific institutional forms of the firm. Table 1 provide a simple 
framework to classify growth regimes along two axes. First, the demand regime can be profit-
led or wage-led, i.e. the effect of an increase in inequality, measured by the profit share, can 
be positive or negative. Second, actual distributional changes can be pro-capital (higher 
inequality) or pro-labour (lower inequality).  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
This simple framework allows for a rich analysis that can be used to compare different 
economic theories as well as different country experiences in specific historic periods. Cell 
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(1,1) depicts a constellation of rising inequality in a profit-led demand regime. This would 
give a virtuous, profit-led growth model. In fact this constellation depicts the trickle-down 
economy that many neoliberals of the early 1980s were propagating. Rising inequality is a 
healthy thing because it comes with growth, which will eventually benefit the poor. This is 
‘neoliberalism in theory’. Cell (1,2) has rising wages in a profit-led economy, which will not 
give rise to a viable growth model, but rather to stagnation. It is this scenario that Margret 
Thatcher was alluding to when she said ‘there is no alternative’: social reform is doomed 
because it cannot generate growth. Cell (2,1) combine a wage-led demand regime with rising 
inequality. This combination cannot deliver a stable growth model, but creates a downward 
pressure on demand. However, growth can still occur if there are other stimulants of growth. 
Indeed, from a PK view, it is this cell were actually existing neoliberalism resides. Empirical 
studies (surveyed by Onaran and Galanis 2014) mostly conclude that private domestic 
demand is wage-led. Rather than generating a profit-led growth regime, neoliberalism has 
relied on financialisation and globalisation as means for demand stimulation. This has 
resulted in two distinct growth models, which are both unstable: debt-driven growth and 
export-driven growth. Both allow for growth, but are intrinsically unstable, because they 
require increasing debt to income ratios. In the case of the debt-driven model it requires 
domestic debt; in the case of the export-driven model it requires foreign debt of the trade 
partners. It is these rising mountains of debt that erupted in the crisis.  
 
PKE thus offers a simple framework that highlights the following features of neoliberalism. 
First, there is tension between what we have called neoliberalism in theory and actually 
existing neoliberalism. Second, actual neoliberalism relies on external stimulation of demand, 
which typically comes with higher debt and is thus prone to instability. Third, there are at 
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least two types of neoliberalism: a (domestic) debt-driven and an export-driven model. In 
other words, there is a finance-led as well as an industrial version of neoliberalism. 
 
Let us now turn to the empirical picture for the European countries. Stockhammer et al 
(2011) and Onaran and Galanis (2014) provide evidence that the Euro area overall is a wage-
led demand regime.4 Individual European countries, in particular ones with small open 
economies may be profit-led, because of the net export component of aggregate demand, but 
as European countries mostly trade among each other, these effects to a large extent cancel 
out at the European level. Growth has not been the result of a profit-led growth regime. 
Rather, two different growth models have emerged: the Anglo-Saxon and southern European 
countries developed a debt-driven growth model, which was driven by increasing household 
debt, strong consumption demand and, in some cases, a residential investment boom (Crouch 
2009 refers to this as ‘privatised Keynesianism’). Other countries, namely Germany, China 
and Japan adopted an export-driven growth model, where domestic demand is weak and 
growth relies on export surpluses. Germany pursued this strategy particularly aggressively 
with average real wages stagnating in the decade prior to the crisis and a sharp increase in 
wage inequality.  
 
The peripheral European countries also followed a debt-driven growth model (see Hein 2013 
for a systematic classification). While the level of household debt has been traditionally low, 
the increase in household debt, which is the variable relevant for consumption expenditures, 
has grown rapidly. Indeed, Table 2 shows that the increase in household debt in the southern 
European countries was not only above the increase in the northern European countries (with 
                                                 
4 There are some Marx-inspired authors, who report evidence for profit-led growth regimes for several countries 
(e.g. Kiefer and Rada 2015) 
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the exception of the Netherlands), but it also exceeded that of the USA and the UK. 
Stockhammer and Wildauer (2016) provide econometric evidence for the role of debt and 
property prices in determining private consumption and residential investment. The rapid 
expansion of credit was made possible to a significant extent through European financial 
integration. The EC’s policy (namely the Financial Services Action Plan) aimed at creating a 
single financial market for Europe (Grahl 2009). In theory this means uniform interest rates 
across Europe and in practise it meant massive capital flows from Germany, France and the 
UK to the peripheral European countries. While this initially fostered manufacturing 
investment (as in the case of Spain and Ireland), it soon fuelled an unsustainable property 
boom.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
At the same time the southern European countries experienced substantially higher price and 
wage inflation. As a consequence the south lost competitiveness. This is illustrated in Table 3 
which gives the growth in unit labour costs (ULC), a standard measure of cost 
competitiveness, from 2000-08. The southern European countries all had a growth of more 
than 24%, compared to a Euro area average of 16% and Germany at 3%. Together with fast 
growth in many southern countries, this resulted in substantial current account deficits, which 
were mirrored by export surpluses in the north. The debt-driven and export-driven growth 
models thus were in symbiotic relation, were credit-driven growth in the south pulled in 
exports from the north and Nordic trade surpluses were recycled as private credit flows to 
southern Europe, where they financed property bubbles and rising household debt.5 In fact 
                                                 
5 Two qualifications are in place. First, actual trade relations are more complex relations than indicated here. For 
example, Germany’s largest export surpluses are with Austria and with France. Austria has had export surpluses 
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the situation differed by country, but a massive increase in private household debt (in 
southern European countries) is the hallmark of this growth. With the exception of Greece, 
public debt was declining (see also de Grauwe 2010). 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Our analysis has some similarities with those put forward by VoC proponents and by Marxist 
Political Economy, but also substantial differences. The VoC approach (Hall 2012, Johnston 
et al 2014) regards differences in wage bargaining coordination and their ability to restrain 
wage growth as the root of the crisis as key for explaining the crisis. Northern countries with 
coordinated wage bargaining systems were able to maintain competitiveness; southern 
countries with less coordinated wage bargaining systems did experience a loss of 
competitiveness. Ultimately this story regards a fixed exchange rate system and excessive 
wage growth in the service sectors in the southern European countries as the root of the crisis. 
The MPE literature (e.g. Lapavitsas et al 2010, Lucarelli 2011, Bellofiori et al 2011) offers a 
similar story, with a different villain. In their analysis Germany used the fixed exchange rate 
regime to embark on wage suppression to further competitiveness. EMU is understood as a 
means of German hegemony and export dominance. Both VoC and MPE stress cost 
differentials as the cause of imbalances. However, southern European countries not only 
experienced a deterioration of their competitive position, but also a better growth 
performance than northern countries. This fact features neither in the explanation of trade 
                                                                                                                                                        
itself. France’s export position was rather balanced in the first half of the 2000s and deteriorated thereafter. Both 
countries had surpluses with southern European countries. Second, financial flows are quite independent of 
trade imbalances. In particular French and British banks have had strong exposure to southern European banks, 
reflecting their positions as financial centres. 
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imbalances, nor is their superior growth performance itself explained. There is no explicit 
role for financialisation in the story. In contrast, the explanation advanced in this paper treats 
financialisation in the south of Europe on equal footing with export orientation and wage 
suppression in the north. Current account imbalances are due to German wage suppression as 
well as to high growth in the peripheral European countries, which was due to property price 
bubble made possible by financial deregulation. 
 
4 Neoliberalism and European economic policy 
 
Neoliberalism develops further classical liberalism. Dardot and Laval (2013) have 
highlighted the importance of ordoliberalism for European integration. Ordoliberalism 
maintains that a system of competitive private markets is the preferable economic system, but 
it goes beyond classical liberalism, firstly, in emphasising the role of government in creating 
markets and maintaining competition and, secondly, in arguing that states have to be 
subjected to strict rules and exposed to competitive pressures.  
 
The question how and why European integration took its neoliberal shape is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Dardot and Laval (2013) argue that the German ordoliberals have shaped the 
process well before neoliberalism became the dominant ideology. They argue that the 
German model of Rheinish capitalism should not be confused with ordoliberalism but 
represents a compromise between ordoliberalism, a strong labour movement and Bismarckian 
conservative tradition. Dyson and Featherstone (1999) in their magisterial analysis of the 
making of the Maastricht Treaty conclude that it represents a victory for neoliberalism (p. 
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791) and that one of its main aims was to ‘bind Leviathan’, i.e. to restrict the scope of state 
activity.6 Central bank independence has always been a key ordoliberal demand (e.g. p. 277)  
 
In continental Europe neoliberalism often came in the guise of European integration and EU 
policies. In particular the free trade agreements of the Single European Act, competition 
policy, and, later, the services directive reflect the liberal creed. The Maastricht Treaty and 
the Stability and Growth Pact combined an anti-inflation priority with a restriction on fiscal 
policy without offering adjustment mechanisms for the imbalances that it gave rise to. 
 
The economic policy regime in the Euro area is enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Stability and Growth Pact, and the Lisbon Treaty (recent changes will be discussed in Section 
5). The basic structure can be summarized as follows: First, fiscal policy is essentially 
national policy. The EU budget, restricted to 2% of GDP, is too small and too inflexible to 
serve a macroeconomic function and cannot provide a counter-cyclical stimulus in case of 
crisis. Second, national fiscal policies are restricted in the short term as the budget deficit 
must not exceed 3% of GDP (except in severe recessions) and they must aim at a balanced 
budget in the medium term. Third, monetary policy is centralized at the EU level and it is 
effectively inflation targeting, with the independent ECB having set the inflation target close 
to or below 2%. Fourth, financial markets are liberalized, internally as well as externally. 
Thus the EU foregoes instruments of controlling credit growth or allocating credit. Fifth, 
there was a no bail-out clause, stating that neither other national governments nor the ECB 
will support individual countries which are facing problems in financing themselves (this is 
the only area where we will see fundamental changes in the policy setup). Sixth, labour 
                                                 
6 Bonefeld (2002) argues that it was a political strategy of national capitalist classes to pursue European 
integration as a means to curtail corporatist national states that proved resilient domestically. 
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markets are supposed to be flexible. The European Commission (EC) and the ECB regard 
wage flexibility as the cure to economic imbalances. By this they mean downward wage 
flexibility (they have not called for higher wages in Germany). But this anti-labour bias 
should not hide the fact that within the economic policy regime of EMU there is an economic 
logic to the argument: with fiscal policy restrained, exchange rate policy abolished and 
monetary policy centralized, all the standard economic policy tools are paralyzed. The burden 
of adjustment thus has to be carried by the labour market and wage policy.  
 
The EU policy package is a form of neoliberalism. It is characterized by a strong belief in the 
efficiency of the market system, a distrust of state activity and an anti-labour bias. However, 
it is not a pure neoliberal setting, but subject to compromises under specific historic 
circumstances. For example Monetarists, which are a variant of neoliberals, have long 
defended flexible exchange rates. But Huerta de Soto (2012), a leading neo-Austrian 
economist, defends the Euro on the grounds that while it may not be the optimal currency 
arrangement, it does constrain government intervention.  
 
The policy package was criticized sharply by PK economists (Arestis et al 2001; Euromemo 
2011; Hein and Truger 2005; Huffschmid 2005; Bibow 2007, Stockhammer 2011): first, they 
predicted, reliance on labour market flexibility will not generate full employment. Wage 
flexibility in a crisis is likely to make things worse: wage cuts will lead to shrinking 
consumption demand and to deflation, which may depress demand further in a debt-burdened 
economy as the real (inflation-adjusted) value of debt increases. Second, the EU policy 
system would create a deflationary bias. In the case of imbalances within the EU, with some 
countries running trade deficits and others running trade surpluses, the burden of adjustment 
would effectively fall on the country with trade deficits. This creates a deflationary bias. The 
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adjustment of the surplus countries would be inflationary and growth-oriented, whereas the 
adjustment of the deficit countries is deflationary. They have to dampen demand (to decrease 
imports) and lower their prices and wages (to restore competitiveness). The exclusive 
reliance on wages as the adjusting variable will create a downward pressure on wages and 
result in prolonged unemployment without solving the EU’s problems.  
 
5 The crisis, the EU policy regime and the nature of money 
 
The Global Financial Crisis began in the US subprime sector. The underlying factors of the 
crisis include financial deregulation, the rise in inequality and the international imbalances 
that had built up. Initially the crisis hit debt-driven and export-driven economies equally. 
However the export-driven economies were quicker to recover as they were not suffering 
from a debt overhang. In the USA the crisis was countered by moderate counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy and by aggressive unconventional monetary policy, which we will refer to as 
quantitative easing (QE). In the USA the crisis turned into a weak recovery. Economic policy 
in Europe was less anti-cyclical. While countries adopted stimulus packages in 2008/09, from 
2010 fiscal policy turned to austerity and, worse, it became most restrictive in those countries 
that were hardest hit by the crisis. Monetary policy in the EU tried to avoid QE as long as it 
could, but as the Euro crisis deepened, the ECB did expand its balance sheet. Given the 
different growth models and differences in economic policy, the crisis led to sharply different 
performances across Europe: a fragile recovery in the north and a depression in the southern 
European countries. 
 
While recent developments have vindicated PK criticisms, the EU’s policy package has not 
changed direction, but become, as of today, more rigid and doctrinaire. The Treaty for 
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Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) has 
tightened the grip on fiscal policy (Grahl 2012). Constitutional debt breaks are to be 
introduced in the Euro member states; there will be an automatic obligation to austerity if 
public debt exceeds the 60% target (the 1/20 rule) and the European Commission will be 
involved in the national budget process (the European Semester). The one area where there 
has been a change in direction is with respect to the no bail-out clause. The EU has, belatedly, 
set up a collective fund for member states that have lost access to market finance (EFSF, 
EMF). This fund gives loans to the countries that are misleadingly referred to as ‘rescue 
packages’ and imposes conditionality that is similar in spirit (if not as far reaching) as IMF 
adjustment programmes.7 
 
The crisis has illustrated the strong interdependence of the government sector and the 
financial system. The crisis thus raises interesting questions about the nature of money and 
the state. Economic theory is divided on the theory of money. Mainstream economics and 
MPE regard money as emerging from private transactions. By contrast, PK theory and 
economic sociology stress that debt relations and in particular government debt and the 
ability of governments to collect taxes in their own currency are the foundation of money 
(Goodhart 1998; Graeber 2011 chapters 2 and 3). Ingham (2004) stresses the state origin of 
money, but highlights that the social mode of production of credit money is through private 
banks. Money thus is a contested field that has sovereign power as a constituent element, but 
                                                 
7 The ‘rescue packages’ have in no case led to a decline in public debt. For example in the case of Greece public 
debt has increased from 113% 2008 to 160.6% 2012, in Ireland from 44.2% to 116.2% (according to the EC’s 
2012 spring forecast). Essentially the ‘rescue packages’ have been gigantic machineries to transform private 
debt into public debt. Credit Suisse estimates that the second Greek rescue package reduced the private sector 
share in the holding of Greek government debt from 62% to 30% (Credit Suisse Economics Research 2012). 
21 
 
private institutions are critically involved. This hybrid nature is also reflected in central 
banks. Most central banks were originally founded in order to strengthen state finances and 
later acquired bank supervision functions. Central banks were first lender of last resort for the 
state and only later became lender of last resort for private banks. Most countries’ central 
banks are public-private hybrids, often with commercial bank representation on the crucial 
decision-making bodies.  
 
This balance between the state and the private sector in the creation of money has been upset 
by EMU, which separated fiscal and monetary spaces and insulated the European Central 
Bank from national governments. Central bank independence was strengthened and the ECB 
was forbidden to fund governments directly. That is by design it was meant to be a lender of 
last resort for the private sector only. Money and monetary policy was to be insulated from 
the political process.  
 
The tension between the public and private nature of money surfaces in the present crisis in 
the close link between public and private debt. Public debt is a private asset. Most 
government bonds are held by private banks and pension funds. They form the most 
important collateral used on money markets and repo markets (Gabor 2014, Mehrling 2011). 
The credibility of public debt is thus essential for the functioning of private debt markets. A 
sovereign debt crisis also poses a mortal threat to the respective country’s banks, as they 
usually lose access to the private financial markets. In the Euro area (in 2010-12) this has 
been amplified by contagion effects as the credibility of one country’s sovereign debt calls 
into question the quality of another country’s assets. But this dialectic between private and 
public debt goes further. The credibility of public debt depends, in many cases, on the 
assessment of private financial institutions. In the case of Spain and Italy, debt levels were 
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clearly sustainable at the interest levels prior to the crisis. After the financial crisis, interest 
spreads on southern European countries increased sharply; essentially the banks started 
speculating against the governments that had rescued them (Weeks 2014). There clearly will 
be some interest rate (and the 7% rate that is frequently used as a benchmark seems plausible) 
where debt levels are unsustainable (in the sense of unserviceable).  
 
From the autumn of 2008 central banks in the USA, the UK and the Euro area aggressively 
expanded their balance sheets. The orders of magnitude are substantial: central bank balance 
sheets tripled in size, expanding from some 6% of GDP to more than 20%. Central banks 
initially focused on buying private assets, but from spring 2009 the Fed and the BoE bought 
government bonds, i.e. they supported government spending. The ECB was, in the early 
phase of the financial crisis, much more hesitant. It started QE later, expanded its balance 
sheet less, and has hardly bought government bonds. At the same time (like its American and 
British counterparts), it has expanded the range of credit to private financial institutions 
(Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 2012). In short, the ECB is playing the role of lender of last resort 
for the financial sector, but – different from the Fed and the BoE –not for the government 
sector. Only in August 2012, when the Greek sovereign debt crisis threatened to engulf the 
other Euro member states, did the ECB commit to accepting government bonds (under the 
condition that those countries submitted to the conditionality of the bailout packages). For 
several European countries the situation is now similar to that of developing countries which 
have debts in a foreign currency. 
 
The crisis is, in our view, due to the fact that Europe has built half a European state, while 
seriously damaging the ability of nation states to counter an economic crisis (and by 
implication to underwrite social compromises). This is not an accident, but a part of the 
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neoliberal agenda. The incapacitation of nation states has several dimensions. The restrictions 
on fiscal policy directly impede governments on the expenditure side. In particular it has 
forced those countries most desperately in need of expansionary fiscal policies to pursue 
austerity.8 The loss of monetary sovereignty means that countries cannot set interest rates 
and, more importantly in times of sovereign debt crisis, they don’t have the lender of last 
resort facility to support the government. The key role of the central bank for the proper 
functioning of a state is illustrated by the stand-off between the Greek government and Euro 
group in July 2015: Once the ECB froze emergency lending to Greek commercial banks the 
Greek government within two week agreed to measures that it had previously, and with 
overwhelming public support in a referendum, rejected.  
 
The common currency turned what would otherwise have been an exchange rate crisis into a 
sovereign debt crisis. The separation of monetary and fiscal space fatally weakened the 
ability to counteract the crisis. The set of rules effectively leaves few policy variables at the 
states’ availability and encourages a wage policy that aims at competitive devaluation. 
 
To restate our explanation of the crisis: At the root of the crisis is a build up of debt, fuelled 
by debt-driven and export-driven variants of neoliberal grown models. These growth models 
were enabled by the neoliberal design of Euro area economic policy framework, which 
encouraged financial deregulation and cross-country capital flows while eliminating the 
possibility of nominal exchange rate adjustments. The crisis escalated in Europe because 
fiscal policy and monetary policy were less anti-cyclical than in Anglo-Saxon countries. The 
crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis in southern Europe, because of the separation of 
                                                 
8 It is difficult to assess the relative impact of this historically. After the EMS crisis the deficit countries also 
pursued austerity policies, but the effects of the latter were alleviated by simultaneous devaluation. 
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monetary and fiscal spaces, or in other words the treaty-consistent refusal of the ECB to back 
the governments of the EU member states.  
 
How does this interpretation of the crisis differ from other explanations? The German 
government and the EU are guided by a fiscal irresponsibility hypothesis, which posits that 
the crisis is at the root one of excessive government spending in combination with inflexible 
labour markets. That is the neoliberal interpretation and guides present policy. For VoC and 
MPE the Euro crisis is most of all the result of a fixed exchange rate regime. VoC proponents 
(Hall 2014, Johnston et al 2013) have argued that the southern European countries have lost 
competitiveness because of its uncoordinated wage bargaining system.9 In other words, 
Germany was better in constraining wage growth. A profit-led demand regime is implicitly 
assumed and there is no central role for financialisation. For many Marxists the Euro system 
allowed Germany to pursue a neo-mercantilist strategy via wage suppression. 
Financialisation has a supporting role as it allows for a recycling of German trade surpluses 
to finance southern Europe’s imports (Bellofiore et al 2010, Lapavitsas et al 2010). There is 
some truth in these arguments, but the PK perspective highlights a different set of factors. As 
regards the origins of the crisis, financialisation and finance-driven growth in southern 
Europe plays a more central role. As regards the escalation of the crisis the neoliberal 
macroeconomic policy regime of the Euro area play the centre role and it is the separation of 
monetary and fiscal space that explains the uniquely European transformation of an economic 
crisis into a sovereign debt crisis. And it is the refusal of the ECB to play the lender of last 
resort to governments that forces national governments to adopt austerity policies.  
                                                 
9 Nölke (2014) offers a comprehensive review of Comparative Political Economy debates on the Euro crisis, 
which focuses on the VoC literature, but also covers, if more selectively, some of the HM-IPE and PKE 
literature. 
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Within the Historical Materialist International Political Economy literature on the Euro crisis, 
there have been some attempts to fuse Marxist-inspired analysis of the state and class 
relations with an economic analysis that draws on Marxist as well as on PK arguments. 
Overbeek (2011), Becker and Jäger (2012) and Ryner (2015) are closest to our approach. All 
of them have a substantial role for financialisation, but have a limited treatment of the 
macroeconomic dynamics or the demand regimes involved. Overbeek stays closest to the 
Marxist framework in asserting an overaccumulation crisis, but notes the importance of 
finance-led growth, without, however, specifying how financialisation affects demand 
formation. He notes that the extent of financialisation is uneven across countries, but claims 
that ‘finance-led accumulation had become the predominant growth model, not only in the 
traditional centre of financial globalism, the UK, but also in most of continental Europe’ 
(Overbeek 2011, 35). No operational definition of finance-led accumulation is provided, but 
it seems to refer to the use of profits rather than to demand regimes. The sovereign debt crisis 
is discussed as result of private bank behaviour, with little discussion of Europe’s economic 
policy regime. Becker and Jäger (2012) offer a contradistinction between export-oriented 
versus financialised economies similar to ours and, indeed, draw on a similar PK literature, 
while maintaining a Marx-inspired regulationist framework. The sovereign debt crisis is not 
analysed and the eastern and southern European countries are discussed within one group, 
which is unsuitable for an analysis sovereign debt crises. Ryner (2015) builds most directly 
on PK analysis and uses a similar notion of finance-led growth, however the focus of the 
paper is on the development of the ‘iron cage’ of ordoliberal discipline that makes up the 
EU’s economic policy regime. Ryner explains this regime as situated in the subordinate role 
of European economies relative to the US financial system and as a mode of adjustment to 
this subordinate role. His analysis is largely complementary to ours, however he does not 
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discuss the sovereign debt crisis explicitly and does not theorise the differential effect that the 
iron cage has on northern and southern European countries. 
 
6 There is an alternative 
 
This paper tells a rather gloomy story, but it also highlights that European Neoliberalism, 
while so far successful politically, has resulted in a deepening of the crisis. Europe now faces 
several challenges: It has to stimulate demand, re-balance its trade flows and relative prices 
and it has to deal with high private and public debt. In principle the cost imbalances can be 
dealt with by inflationary adjustment (that is adjustment in the surplus countries to increase 
prices and output) or by deflationary adjustment in the deficit countries (Stockhammer and 
Sotiropoulos 2014). The latter is presently being pursued under the name of ‘internal 
devaluation’.  
 
A PK economic strategy would involve a very different economic policy mix, one that breaks 
thoroughly with Neoliberalism (e.g. Arestis et al 2001, Hein 2013). It would use deficit 
spending for demand stimulation and have full employment as its overall goal. Here we want 
to outline the structural features of the policy package rather than specific short term 
measures. A PK strategy aims for an inflationary adjustment strategy, which means higher 
demand wage growth in surplus countries (Germany). First, wage policy would not aim at 
wage flexibility, but at an equitable income distribution that is consistent with relative trade 
positions. This would involve policies to set a system of transnationally coordinated wage 
bargaining that takes into consideration issues of equity and trade balances. This requires a 
strengthening of collective bargaining structures and ought to be complemented by a 
European system of national minimum wages (Schulten and Watt 2007). The macroeconomic 
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aim of European wage coordination ought to be higher wage growth in the trade surplus 
countries which would help prevent imbalances. Simply put, southern European countries 
need much higher wage growth in Germany – or else they have to go into deflation. 
 
Second, the financial sector needs restructuring and shrinking. Debt restructuring will in 
some cases be necessary to make debt manageable, but in general the Keynesian strategy 
aims at raising income rather than deleting debt. An inflationary environment would facilitate 
reducing the debt level. To counteract the regressive distributional effects of bank rescues, a 
substantial wealth tax would have to be introduced. Bailed-out financial institutions would be 
put under public control to ensure change in management practises. Financial regulation 
would lean against asset price bubbles and would use a richer set of instruments, e.g. asset-
specific reserve requirement to control credit growth.  
 
Third, there needs to be a robust mechanism of redistribution across regions that does not rely 
on generosity and bail-outs. A European social security system would serve that function as it 
redistributes income from prosperous to depressed regions without increasing debt levels. 
This would build a system of funding financial flows to deficit units that does not create 
rising liabilities for either the private or the public sector. The institutions of the labour 
movement have so far been opposed to transferring social policy competences to the 
European level: the European level has typically been more prone to pro-capital lobbying 
than national institutions. A European social security system would thus have to come with 
institution-building that guaranteed a role for labour organisations (or more broadly labour 
and capital) in the administration and funding decisions of the institution.  
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Forth, the Keynesian policy package frees fiscal policy from the shackles of the present 
regime. In principle, fiscal policy has to be used to ensure that aggregate demand is at a level 
to ensure full employment. This implies a strong anti-cyclical component. Part of this can be 
delivered by automatic stabilisers like unemployment benefits and a progressive income tax, 
but a substantial part will be discretionary policy. States need to be able to react if their 
economy is facing a recession or high unemployment. Specifically, this means that the 
southern European countries should see large increase in government spending as their output 
level a well below capacity. In that situation budget deficits are desirable. Ideally these 
expenditures would to come out of a European budget. Effectively, these measures would 
amount to the creation of a European welfare state. This could give a new life to the project 
of European integration. And it would make economic sense. 
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Table 1. A typology of distribution and growth regimes 
  Actual distributional changes 
  Pro-capital Pro-labour 
Demand regime Profit-led Virtuous profit-led 
growth process 
(‘neoliberalism in 
theory) 
Stagnation or 
external demand 
stimulation (‘Failed 
social reform’) 
Wage-led Stagnation or 
external demand 
stimulation, e.g. via 
debt-driven or 
export-driven growth 
(‘actually existing 
neoliberalism’) 
Virtuous wage-led 
growth process 
(‘social 
Keynesianism’) 
Source: adapted from Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013 
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Table 2. Increase in household debt (in % GDP), 2000-08 
Northern European Countries Anglo-Saxon Countries 
Germany  -11.3 USA 26 
Netherlands  32.8 United Kingdom 28.1 
Austria 7.9 Southern European Countries 
France 15.8 Ireland 62.7 
  Greece 35.5 
  Spain 33.8 
  Portugal 27.4 
Source: Eurostat, except USA: FoF   
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Table 3. Increase in unit labour costs (ULC), 2000-08 
Northern European Countries Southern European Countries 
Germany 3% Ireland 33% 
Netherlands 19% Greece 26% 
Austria 9% Spain 30% 
  Italy 27% 
Euro Area (12) 16% Portugal 24% 
Source: AMECO 
 
 
